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Abstract
In recent years, evidence has accumulated to suggest the hippocampus plays a role beyond memory. A strong hippocampal
response to sceneshas beennoted, and patientswith bilateral hippocampal damage cannot vividly recall scenes from their past
or construct scenes in their imagination. There is debate aboutwhether the hippocampus is involved in the online processing of
scenes independent of memory. Here, we investigated the hippocampal response to visually perceiving scenes, constructing
scenes in the imagination, and maintaining scenes in working memory. We found extensive hippocampal activation for
perceiving scenes, and a circumscribed area of anterior medial hippocampus common to perception and construction. There
was signiﬁcantly less hippocampal activity for maintaining scenes in working memory. We also explored the functional
connectivity of the anterior medial hippocampus and found signiﬁcantly stronger connectivity with a distributed set of brain
areas during scene construction comparedwith scene perception. These results increase our knowledge of the hippocampus by
identifying a subregion commonlyengaged by scenes,whether perceived or constructed, by separating scene construction from
working memory, and by revealing the functional network underlying scene construction, offering new insights into why
patients with hippocampal lesions cannot construct scenes.
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Introduction
The neuroimaging literature is replete with studies showing that
posterior parahippocampal cortex (PHC) and retrosplenial cortex
(RSC) are more engaged by scenes than other types of stimuli
(Epstein andKanwisher 1998; Epstein 2008; Ranganath and Ritchey
2012).While PHC and RSC involvement in processing scene‐related
information is not in doubt, in recent years the hippocampus has
also been linked with scenes.
Patients with bilateral hippocampal damage and amnesia are
not only impaired at recalling events from their past, but also at
imagining events in their personal future. Klein et al. (2002) de-
scribed patient D.B., who was amnesic and could not imagine
his personal past or future, but had preserved semantic knowl-
edge and could use it to reason about general (nonpersonal)
past and future events. Andelman et al. (2010) reported the case
of patient M.C. who, following an epileptic episode, experienced
bilateral hippocampal damage and similarly could not recall
years of her past or imagine her personal future. To investigate
the shared process which may underlie recalling past and im-
agining future scenes, Hassabis, Kumaran, and Vann et al. (2007)
asked a group of patientswith bilateral hippocampal damage and
amnesia to construct atemporal scenes (i.e., not set in the past or
the future) in their imagination. The patients were impaired at
constructing scenes relative to matched control subjects (repli-
cated by Mullally, Intraub, and Maguire 2012) with a speciﬁc def-
icit noted in the spatial coherence of their imagined experiences.
This suggested that the hippocampus may perform a common
function for the construction of scenes in the imagination,
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regardless of whether they are memories from one’s past, atem-
poral ﬁctitious events, or events set in one’s personal future (Has-
sabis and Maguire 2007, 2009; Maguire and Mullally 2013).
Neuroimaging studies have since conﬁrmed hippocampal en-
gagement during the construction of static scenes (Hassabis, Ku-
maran, and Maguire 2007) and the construction of future
episodes (Addis, Wong et al. 2007) in healthy controls, and have
demonstrated a network of co-activated regions including hippo-
campus, PHC, RSC, and medial prefrontal cortex.
As well as the active construction of scenes, the role of the
hippocampus in perceiving scenes has stimulated signiﬁcant de-
bate. A series of studies have demonstrated that patients with
hippocampal lesions are impaired at discriminating scenes but
not other forms of visual stimuli (Lee, Buckley et al. 2005; Lee,
Bussey et al. 2005), as well as identifying a hippocampal response
to scene discrimination in neurologically healthy participants
(Leeetal. 2008;Barenseet al. 2010). Thoseauthors suggest thehip-
pocampus may provide an allocentric or viewpoint-independent
representation of the scenes which facilitates discrimination,
performing pattern separation to distinguish highly similar spa-
tial conﬁgurations (Lee et al. 2012). Perceptual and memory deﬁ-
cits following medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage occur, they
suggest, because complex conjunctions of spatial information
in hippocampus and object information in perirhinal cortex are
lost (Graham et al. 2010). A separate line of evidence has also im-
plicated the hippocampus in scene perception. Patients with hip-
pocampal lesions show attenuated boundary extension (BE)
(Intraub and Richardson 1989)—the automatic process of ex-
trapolating beyond the view in scenes (Mullally, Intraub, and
Maguire 2012). Chadwick et al. (2013) found the hippocampus to
be engaged when healthy controls viewed simple scenes and BE
occurred. Thus, the hippocampus may be involved in the percep-
tion of scenes—either when comprehending the current scene in
view, or predicting beyond the edges of the scene.
A link between perception and imaginationwas highlighted by
Gaesseret al. (2011),who investigated the level of detail included in
narrative descriptions of scenephotographs, imaginedevents, and
autobiographical memories, in healthy young and older adults.
Following an established protocol (Levine et al. 2002; Addis et al.
2008), they divided narratives into episodic “internal” details (e.
g., who, what, where, when) and semantic “external” details.
They found that the number of episodic details in the descriptions
of photographs, which declined with age, predicted the number of
episodic details for imagined events and for autobiographical
memories, suggesting a commonprocess involvedwith scene per-
ception, imagination, and autobiographical memory.
There has been signiﬁcant opposition to studies demonstrat-
ing hippocampal involvement in scene processing, with other re-
ports showing that patients with hippocampal lesions are not
impaired at discrimination tasks (Shrager et al. 2006; Kim et al.
2011). It has been concluded from these studies that previous
ﬁndings of deﬁcits can be explained by patients’ inability to
learn across trials, long-term memory (LTM) encoding difﬁcul-
ties, and unidentiﬁed lesions beyond the hippocampus (Shrager
et al. 2006; Suzuki 2009; Kimet al. 2011; Knutson et al. 2012). There
is further evidence that patients with hippocampal lesions ap-
pear to have intact scene perception. Race et al. (2011) used a
similar protocol to Gaesser et al. (2011), althoughwith simple car-
toon stimuli rather than scene photographs, in order to test the
scene perception of 8 amnesic patients with hippocampal dam-
age. They found that while the patients had impoverished de-
scriptions of personal past and future events, their ability to
describe narratives for cartoon pictures placed in front of them
was matched to controls. This suggested that the hippocampus
may not be required for processing the scene currently in view.
Mullally, Intraub, and Maguire (2012) similarly tested 7 patients
with focal bilateral hippocampal damage and amnesia on their
ability to describe a scene photograph. They found that partici-
pants could accurately describe a photograph, and they could
reason about what objects may come into view if the participant
imagined that the standpoint of the picturewasmoved backward
by a few paces. However, in contrast to healthy controls, the pa-
tients omitted references to the spatial arrangement of objects
beyond the edges of a picture, suggesting that the hippocampus
may only be required for processing the scene beyond the current
view. Although one study found that hippocampal patients were
impaired in describing real-life and pictorial scenes (Zeman et al.
2013), this was based on patients with mixed etiology, no struc-
tural detail on their lesionswas provided and this could not be re-
plicated in a subsequent study by Race et al. (2013). In summary,
there is a lack of consensus in the literature over whether the
hippocampus is involved in scene perception, and this is compli-
cated by potential confounds such as memory encoding.
On the basis that scene construction engages the hippocam-
pus during imagination (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al. 2007,
Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire 2007), we hypothesized that,
in neurologically healthy participants, simply perceiving scenes
(without a comparison or discrimination task) may engage the
hippocampus, reﬂecting the creation of an internal model of
the scene. Under this hypothesis, differences in ﬁndings across
studies on scene perception would be due to whether or not par-
ticipants constructed a spatially coherent model of the scene on
each trial of the experiment. This idea accords with recent ﬁnd-
ings that the hippocampus is engaged by discriminating scenes
based on their global conﬁguration, or “strength-based percep-
tion,” but not when discriminations are based on differences in
local visual features, or “state-based perception” (Aly and Yoneli-
nas 2012; Aly et al. 2013). Similarly, Hartley et al. (2007) proposed
that the hippocampus would be engaged “when a ﬂexible or allo-
centric representation of spatial layout is required.” In this study,
for the ﬁrst time, we set out to directly compare scene perception
and scene construction to test whether there is evidence that
both functions share a neural substrate involving, in particular,
the hippocampus.
We also took this opportunity to investigate a second aspect
of scene construction. When someone constructs a scene in his
or her imagination, in addition to creating the scene representa-
tion, he or she must also maintain it in working memory. While
the establishedmodel of hippocampal function is that it is not in-
volved in working memory (Cave and Squire 1992; Alvarez et al.
1994), this has been challenged in recent years (see Ranganath
and Blumenfeld 2005 for review) and is a topic of active debate.
For instance, Hannula et al. (2006) reported that patients with
hippocampal lesions had impairments in maintaining spatial
relations between items within scenes as well as face–scene as-
sociations, which they suggested showed amore general impair-
ment in short-term relationalmemory. Several studieshave shown
an interaction between stimulus type (scene or non-scene) and
working memory load (Stern et al. 2001; Hartley et al. 2007; Lee
and Rudebeck 2010), and others have suggested a role for the
hippocampus in maintaining object–location associations (Olson,
Moore, et al. 2006; Olson, Page, et al. 2006). Cashdollar et al. (2009)
used MEG to investigate scene maintenance in controls and pa-
tients with bilateral hippocampal sclerosis, and found increased
synchronicity of occipital and temporal regions with hippocam-
pal theta during maintenance of spatial (conﬁgural) information
about the scene, suggesting the hippocampus may mediate the
maintenance of scenes in working memory. In contrast, Schon
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et al. (2009) found no effect of working memory load for scenes
during working memory maintenance. Jeneson and Squire
(2012) suggested that it is a question of capacity—if a task re-
quires more than can be held in the limited capacity of working
memory, then LTM will be required, which engages the medial
temporal lobes. However, they gave no consideration of how
the content of the maintained material might modulate hippo-
campal activation. In reviewing the same literature, Yonelinas
(2013) discussed experiments using scene stimuli which indi-
cated a working memory deﬁcit following hippocampal lesions,
although this was viewed as part of a wider notion that the
hippocampus supports “high-resolution bindings.”Given the ap-
parent hippocampal preference for scenes already discussed, it
seems crucial to consider the nature of the stimuli and not just
the working memory load. Surprisingly, many fMRI studies on
scene maintenance either have not examined or did not report
data from the hippocampus (e.g., Johnson et al. 2007; Yi et al.
2008; Park et al. 2010), a limitationwe aimed to address in the cur-
rent study. We did not set out to characterize all aspects of work-
ing memory, rather we aimed to address a speciﬁc question—is
working memory maintenance sufﬁcient to explain the hippo-
campal response to scene construction? We hypothesized that
scenemaintenancewould not be sufﬁcient to explain activations
associatedwith scene construction, and thus scenemaintenance
would result in signiﬁcantly less activation of the hippocampus,
if any.
The third aim of this study was to explore the functional con-
nectivity of the hippocampus during scene construction and
scene perception. Little is known about the connectivity of
brain regions during scene processing, and this is especially
true of the connectivity between cortex and hippocampus
which has largely been overlooked by the recent trend of studies
examining large-scale brain networks (Bullmore and Sporns
2009). Initial insights come from 2 recent studies. Chadwick
et al. (2013) applied dynamic causal modeling and found that
the hippocampus had a top-down inﬂuence on early visual
areas during BE. Aly et al. (2013) used a psychophysiological inter-
action (PPI) analysis to demonstrate greater interaction between
hippocampus and lingual gyrus with conﬁdence judgments in a
scene discrimination task. Taking our lead from these studies
looking at task-related changes in connectivity, we hoped to
gain better insights into the relationship between the hippocam-
pus and other regions of the network engaged during scene con-
struction (Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire 2007; Summerﬁeld
et al. 2010), including RSC, precuneus, PHC, andmedial prefrontal
cortex. While there is anatomical evidence for indirect anato-
mical pathways linking early visual areas to the hippocampus
(Kravitz et al. 2011), there is limited evidence for the functional
connections which would be employed during scene perception,
and we were interested to test for similarities and differences in
connectivity between scene perception and scene construction.
We hypothesized that constructing scenes would induce con-
nectivity between the hippocampus and regions performing
2 functions. The ﬁrst would be those which store elements of the
scenewhichwould be brought together into a coherent represen-
tation. For instance, semantic information would be provided by
lateral temporal lobe regions, including anteriormiddle temporal
gyrus and superior temporal sulcus which have been implicated
in autobiographical memory (Svoboda et al. 2006) and imagining
(Addis et al. 2009) and have been suggested to act as an amodal
hub for linking together information of different modalities into
uniﬁed concepts (Binder et al. 2009; Binney et al. 2010; Pobric
et al. 2010). We also expected strong connectivity between hippo-
campus and perirhinal cortex/lateral occipital cortex to provide
object information; however, our use of single-object baselines
may preclude this being observed. The second categoryof regions
we expected were in the visual processing hierarchy, in order to
support vivid re-experiencing of the scenes. These may be pri-
mary occipital regions, following previous observations of re-
activation of occipital cortex in imagination (Ganis et al. 2004;
Slotnick et al. 2005), connectivity with lingual gyrus as shown
using scenediscrimination inAlyet al. (2013) and top-down inﬂu-
ence of the hippocampus on early occipital cortex shown during
BE (Chadwick et al. 2013). We also expected to see regions along
the dorsal visual pathway including parietal and retrosplenial re-
gions, whichmay facilitate the interface between allocentric hip-
pocampal representations and egocentric visual stimuli (Burgess
et al. 2001; Byrne et al. 2007; Auger et al. 2012).
A dearth of previous datamakes predicting hippocampal con-
nectivity during scene perception less certain. If early visual re-
gions are driven in a top-down fashion by a hippocampal model
when imagining scenes, as we hypothesize, then we would ex-
pect weaker connectivity with the hippocampus when they are
driven by real visual stimuli. Even if scene perception does in-
volve the creation of a hippocampus-dependent model of the
scene, it is uncertain whether passive scene viewing would tax
the hippocampus to as great an extent as constructing scenes
in the imagination. Thus, how the strength of connections
would compare between these conditions was an open question.
For scene maintenance, if hippocampal engagement was found,
we expected this to be with regions of the “dorsal attention net-
work” (Gitelman et al. 1999; Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Ptak and
Schnider 2010).
To summarize, there is an increasing appreciation that the
mental simulation of scenes may be central to hippocampal
function (Hassabis and Maguire 2007, 2009; Schacter et al. 2012;
Maguire andMullally 2013); however, there are gaps in our knowl-
edge. In this fMRI study, we set out to characterize the hippocam-
pal response to scenes by directly comparing scene perception,
scene construction, and the maintenance of scenes in working
memory. We addressed 3 questions. First, does scene perception
engage the hippocampus? Second,when constructing (imagining)
scenes, is the hippocampus involvedwith the initial construction
of the scene, or with maintaining the scene representation
in working memory, or with both? And third, we explored a re-
lated issue about which little is currently known, namely, what
is the hippocampal functional connectivity with the rest of the
brain during scene perception, scene construction, and scene
maintenance?
Materials and Methods
Participants
There were 25 healthy, right-handed participants (10 males,
mean age 26.16 years, SD 4.38). All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and gave informed written consent to participa-
tion in accordance with the University College London research
ethics committee.
Tasks and Procedure
Prior to scanning, participants were trained and given practice on
the tasks,which involved constructing scenes in the imagination,
perceiving visually presented scenes, or maintaining scenes in
working memory. The prescan brieﬁng began with an explan-
ation of the tasks using pictures of the screens participants
would later experience in the scanner (with stimuli not used in
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the scanning experiment) as visual aids. Participants then experi-
enced 6 trials of the experiment while sitting at a desktop com-
puter with the room lights extinguished, as it would appear in
the scanner. To ensure they understood the task demands for
scene and object construction, they then constructed 2 scenes
and 2 objects out loud with the experimenter listening to ensure
that they were performing the construction tasks correctly. They
were then safety checked and taken to the scanner.
Each trial began with constructing or perceiving a scene. On
some trials, the subject was then cued to maintain the scene in
working memory, whereas other trials required the subject to
perceive or construct a second scene. All trials ended with at-
tending to a ﬁxation cross. There were 6 types of scene trial,
each with a different combination of constructing, perceiving,
and maintaining scenes (Fig. 1).
Constructing scene trials began with a two-word cue (e.g.,
“Old library”) displayed for 1.5 s. Participants then created the
scene in their imagination for the 8 s which followed, during
which time the screen was blank. The duration of this period
was determined by pilot testing to ensure subjects were comfort-
able performing the task. The prescan training emphasized that
participants should make the scenes as vivid as possible and
that they should keep their eyes open throughout. Use of episodic
memory was discouraged, with subjects told “do not think of a
scene you have experienced before, we want you to come up
with something new.” The cues were designed to be of a similar
nature to the scene types used in the perceive scene condition,
such as “bus shelter,” “indoor pool,” and “hairdresser’s salon.”
Perceiving scene trials beganwith the cue “View Scene” displayed
for 1.5 s, followed by a photograph of a scene displayed for 8 s.
The scene photographs were selected to be an assortment of
emotionally neutral indoor and outdoor, urban and rural scenes.
For instance, they included a photograph of a typical UK high
street, a park, and a bedroom. Participants were trained to per-
ceive the scenes without attempting to recall episodicmemories.
Having just constructed or perceived a scene, on some trials
subjects saw the instruction “Maintain Scene.” They had been
trained to hold a mental image of the most recent scene in their
mind’s eye,without changing anything orusing their imagination.
Each scene condition had a matching object baseline condi-
tion. These were identical, except that subjects had to con-
struct/perceive/maintain a single acontextual object alone
against a plain white background. These were typical everyday
objects, such as a shoe, a plant pot, or an apple. A simple vigi-
lance task acted as a visual baseline. Participants were shown
the cue “Pay attention,” after which a green cross appeared.
Figure 1. Scene trial types during the fMRI task. (A) Perceive then Maintain Scene—participants perceived a scene and then were cued to maintain that scene in their
mind’s eye while the screen went blank. (B) Construct then Maintain Scene—participants were given a two-word cue (e.g., “Old Library”), which indicated the scene
they then had to construct in their mind’s eye while the screen was blank. They were then cued to maintain that scene without changing anything. (C–F) The
remaining trial types were Construct then Construct a different scene, Perceive then Perceive a different scene, Perceive then Perceive the same scene, and Perceive
then Construct a different scene. For fMRI analysis, trials were divided into their ﬁrst and second parts and collapsed to form regressors for perceive scenes, construct
scenes, maintain perceived scenes, and maintain constructed scenes.
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They had to count the number of times the cross ﬂashed red,
which happened once, twice, or never in the course of a trial.
Upon the ﬁxation cross returning to black, participants indicated
the number of ﬂashes they saw using a keypad held in the right
hand. Therewas one catch trial (where ﬂashes actually occurred)
per scanning session.
The full text of the training instructions is provided in Supple-
mentary Text 1. Following training, participants underwent
3 consecutive scanning sessions, each around 16 min in length.
For each participant, a total of 156 trials (72 scenes, 72 objects,
12 visual baselines) were presented in pseudo-random order
and balanced across the 3 scanning sessions. Immediately fol-
lowing scanning, subjects completed a surprise memory test to
evaluate their level of attention during the task. This involved a
set of stimuli being shown to the participants, 33% of which
were novel (lures) and the remainder were all the scene pictures,
object pictures, and two-word scene and object construction cues
used during scanning. Participants indicated with a button press
whether they believed each stimulus was seen earlier, or was
novel. Finally, the subjects were interviewed in order to collect
ratings and to probe the cognitive strategies employed during
the scanning tasks.
Image Acquisition
MRI datawere acquired on a 3TMagnetomAllegra head-onlyMRI
scanner (Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany) operated with
the standard transmit-receive 12-channel head coil. Functional
MRI data were acquired in 3 sessions with a blood oxygenation
level–dependent (BOLD)-sensitive T2*-weighted single-shot
echo-planar imaging sequence which was optimized to minim-
ize signal dropout in the medial temporal lobe (Weiskopf et al.
2006). The sequence used a descending slice acquisition order
with a slice thickness of 2 mm, an interslice gap of 1 mm, and
an in-plane resolution of 3 × 3 mm. Forty-eight slices were col-
lected covering the entire brain, resulting in a repetition time of
2.88 s. The echo time was 30 ms and the ﬂip angle 90°. All data
were acquired at a −45° angle to the anterior–posterior axis. In
addition, ﬁeldmapswere collected for subsequent distortion cor-
rection. These were acquired with a double-echo gradient echo
ﬁeld map sequence (TE = 10 and 12.46 ms, TR = 1020 ms, matrix
size 64 × 64, with 64 slices, voxel size = 3 mm3) covering the
whole head. After these functional scans, a 3D MDEFT
T1-weighted structural scan was acquired for each participant
with 1-mm isotropic resolution (Deichmann et al. 2004).
Behavioral Data Analysis
Data from the post-scan memory test and interview were ana-
lyzed using repeated-measures ANOVAs and paired sample t-
tests (SPSS 17.0, Chicago: SPSS, Inc.). The signiﬁcance was set at
P < 0.05.
FMRI Data Analysis
Functional MRI data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping 8 (SPM8) (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/SPM). The ﬁrst 6
“dummy” volumes from each of the 3 sessions were discarded
to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Images were realigned and
unwarped (using the ﬁeld maps) and normalized to a standard
template in MNI space using the DARTEL toolbox with a re-
sampled voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm.
The ﬁrst analysis tested for a main effect of scenes across the
whole brain. Data were smoothed using a 4-mm Gaussian kernel
and entered into a general linear model (GLM) for each subject.
Each trial was modeled as the onset of a cue with a duration of
∼9.5 s (i.e., each condition in Figure 1 was split into its 2 constitu-
ent parts). This formed 8 task regressors: construct scenes, per-
ceive scenes, maintain constructed scenes, and maintain
perceived scenes, plus each of their corresponding object base-
lines. Additional regressors removed the effects of head motion
and catch trials in the visual baseline condition. To ensure that
regressors would be uniquely identiﬁable, we used an experi-
mental design with pseudo-randomized trial order. To validate
the identiﬁability of the regressors, we examined the “design or-
thogonality” matrix produced by SPM for an example subject,
which gives the cosine angle between all pairs of regressors in
the model. The maximum (most collinear) absolute cosine
angle between 2 task-related regressors was 0.15, with mean
(non-zero) absolute cosine angle of 0.04. Wewere therefore satis-
ﬁed that parameters relating to our conditions of interest were
identiﬁable. Subject-speciﬁc parameter estimates pertaining to
each regressor of interest (betas) were calculated for each voxel.
Second-level random effects analyses were then run using one
sample t-tests on these parameter estimates, collapsed across
sessions. We report these results at a peak-level threshold of
P <0.05 family-wise error (FWE) corrected.
To investigate our ﬁrst 2 experimental questions—the rela-
tionship betweenperceiving and constructing scenes, and the re-
lationship between constructing and maintaining scenes, we
examined hippocampal responses within regions of interest
(ROIs) for left hippocampus and right hippocampus. These were
manually segmented from the averaged structural MRI scan of
the 25 participants. We used an identical GLM as described
above, except we used unsmoothed fMRI data to avoid activa-
tions encroaching from neighboring thalamus and PHC. Using
SPM’s corrected statistics on the unsmoothed data would have
violated the smoothness assumptions of random ﬁeld theory,
and so signiﬁcance thresholds were instead calculated at the se-
cond level using the nonparametric SnPM toolbox (http://go.
warwick.ac.uk/tenichols/snpm). Results were thresholded at P
<0.05 FWE-corrected for the small volume of bilateral hippocam-
pus (minimumcluster size of 3 voxels). To quantify responses,we
further subdivided the anatomical masks into anterior and pos-
terior regions, with the most posterior slice of the uncus (y =−21)
deﬁned as the rear-most slice of anterior hippocampus. We then
extracted the maximum response for each experimental condi-
tion within each mask and subtracted the object baseline re-
sponses from the scene responses. These results were then
entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA and reported.
Our third experimental question concerned the functional
connectivity between the hippocampus and the rest of the
brain.We identiﬁed a region of overlap between scene perception
and scene construction in each hippocampus, deﬁned using a
simple conjunction (logical AND) between FWE-corrected images
for the contrasts: construct scenes–construct objects AND per-
ceive scenes–perceive objects. The results of this conjunction
(falling within the mask of bilateral hippocampi) were then di-
vided into left and right hemispheres, and used as functional
masks for the left and right ROIs. The signal from each functional
mask was then extracted by taking the ﬁrst eigenvariate (princi-
pal component) of the voxels’ time series within that mask. We
then examined their connectivity with the rest of cortex using
the gPPI toolbox (McLaren et al. 2012). A gPPI analysis performs
a similar function as a conventional PPI analysis, asking whether
anywhere in the brain has a stronger relationship with the seed
region during one condition compared with another (i.e., an
interaction between the task and the time series of the seed
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region, regressed against every voxel in the brain using a GLM).
The advantage of the gPPI approach over the standard PPI imple-
mentation is that it allows the experimenter to include all experi-
mental conditions in a single model for a given seed region. A
gPPI model was built and estimated for each ROI—one for the
left hippocampal ROI and one for the right. Each model had PPI
regressors for perceiving, constructing, maintaining perceived
and maintaining constructed scenes, plus each of their object
baselines (a PPI regressor being the time series of the ROI multi-
plied by the ON times of the conditions, which was then con-
volved with the canonical hemodynamic response function).
Standard nuisance regressors for PPI analyses were also included
(the seed region, the raw task regressors in addition to 6 motion
regressors). Contrasts were calculated on these models for [(per-
ceive scenes PPI – perceive objects PPI) – (construct scenes PPI –
construct objects PPI)] and the reverse. The resulting contrast
images were then summarized at the second level using
one sample t-tests and displayed graphically on a “glass brain”
with cerebella removed for clarity. Given the exploratory nature
of the gPPI analyses, results were thresholded at P <0.001 uncor-
rected for multiple comparisons with a minimum extent of 5
voxels.
Results
Behavioral data
Attention to the Task
We tested attention during scanning using a simple incidental
task. In the visual baseline condition, subjects were instructed
to watch a green ﬁxation cross and press a button to indicate
whether it ﬂashed red once, twice, or never. Three of 12 such
trials were catch trials where ﬂashes occurred, with one catch
trial per scanning session. Subjects gave the correct response,
on average, during 2.92 out of 3 catch trials (SD 0.28). There
were no false-positive responses. We further evaluated attention
to the task using a surprise post-scanning memory test. Subjects
were showna set of stimuli, two thirds ofwhichwere all the stim-
uli used during scanning (photographs from the perceive scene/
object conditions, and text cues from the scene and object con-
struct conditions), and one-third were lures. The task was to re-
spond with “remember” or “don’t remember” for each construct
scene, construct object, perceive scene, and perceive object
stimulus. Participants correctly identiﬁed 88.12% (SD 9.99%),
90.12% (SD 12%), 84.24% (SD 11.87%), and 86.56% (SD 12.49%) of
stimuli, respectively. A repeated-measures ANOVA showed
these results did not depend on whether the stimulus was a
scene or object (F1,24 = 3.16, P = 0.09), whether constructed or
perceived (F1,24 = 3.54, P = 0.07) or their interaction (F1,24 = 0.17, P =
0.90). A post hoc t-test conﬁrmed no signiﬁcant difference be-
tween the construct scenes and perceive scenes conditions
(t(24) = 1.87, P = 0.07). The false-positive rate was under 6% in all
conditions.
Scene Construction Ratings
The “construct scene” condition required subjects to imagine
novel scenes during scanning. The baseline condition “construct
object” required subjects to imagine single novel objects, on their
own without a surrounding scene or context. A series of post-
scan ratings were used to evaluate subjects’ performance on
these tasks.
On a scale of 1–5 (maximum vividness = 5) subjects rated the
vividness of the scenes and objects they constructed (scenes:
mean 3.56, SD 0.71; objects: mean 3.96, SD 0.18) and this did not
differ signiﬁcantly for scene and object trials (t(24) = 2.0, P = 0.06).
They also rated the realism of their constructed scenes and ob-
jects (rating 1–5, completely realistic maximum = 5; scenes:
mean 3.88, SD 0.83; objects: mean 4.48 SD 0.65), and this was sig-
niﬁcantly greater for objects than scenes (t(24) = 3.133, P = 0.005).
We also asked subjects about the content of their constructed
scenes. They reported that on average 38.4% (SD 24.45%) of con-
structed scenes contained people, and 24.8% (SD 33.13%) implied
movement. Fifty percent of stimuli used in the view scene condi-
tion contained people and 24% impliedmovement. Therewas no
signiﬁcant difference between constructed and perceived scenes
for either measure of content (people: t(24) = 0.31, P = 0.76; move-
ment: t(24) = 0.17, P = 0.87). Subjects were instructed to keep their
imagined viewpoint within scenes in a ﬁxed position and only
construct what they would see in front of them (rating 1–5, max-
imum success at maintain a ﬁxed viewpoint = 5; mean 3.56
SD 0.65). For the baseline object conditions, participants were in-
structed to imagine objects in isolation without a surrounding
scene or context (rating 1–5, success at imagining in isolation
maximum= 5; mean 3.92 SD 1.04).
Perceive Scene Ratings
Each “perceive scene” trial required subjects to passively study a
photograph of a scene during scanning. To ensure separation
from the construct conditions, it was important that subjects
did not make signiﬁcant use of their imagination. Subjects
rated their use of imagination while looking at the scenes (rating
1–5, maximum use of imagination = 5: mean 1.60, SD 0.82), and
the extent of their mind wandering during the task (rating 1–5,
maximum occurrence of mind wandering = 5: mean 1.48 SD
0.82). These 2 ratings were not taken for perceiving object base-
lines. We also asked participants to describe how they spent
their time during both the perceive scenes and perceive objects
conditions, and we subsequently categorized these responses
into those that suggested any imagination or self-projection
with regards to perceived scenes/objects, and those which only
indicated passive viewing. Twenty-one of 25 subjects reported
passive strategies for scene viewing whereas 4 made mention
of some interaction with the stimuli, for example “I felt . . . the
temperature on the beach,” referring to a scene stimulus depict-
ing a sandy beach. For object baselines, therewere also 21/25 sub-
jects who reported passive viewing strategies. The remaining
4 subjects, none of whomwas the same as the 4 nonpassive sub-
jects in the perceive scenes condition, included comments such
as “I looked at details, imagined how it would feel—the textures.”
While both ratings and descriptive measures showed that the
majority of participants were not overtly using their imagination,
we still conﬁrmed that the 4 participants describing more active
scene viewing were not unduly inﬂuencing our imaging results.
We did this by re-analyzing our key fMRI analyses with only the
21 subjects reporting passive scene viewing and we found no dif-
ferences in the results (Supplementary Text 2).
Maintain Scene Ratings
During the “maintain scenes’ condition, subjects held an image
of the most recently perceived or constructed scene in their
mind’s eye (and likewise for “maintain objects’). After scanning,
participants reported their degree of success at maintaining the
original stimuli without changing them (rating 1–5, maximum
success at not changing items = 5: scenes mean 4.16, SD 0.16; ob-
jects mean 4.6, SD 0.1); although the success rating was high for
both conditions, it was signiﬁcantly higher for objects (t(24) = 3.38,
P = 0.003). Participantswere also asked the question “Howdid you
go about the maintain scenes task?” We sorted the responses
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according to whether subjects reported active processes, such as
scanning the scene in their mind’s eye, or instead gave a re-
sponse that suggested passivity. Sixteen of 25 subjects reported
active processes, such as “replaying details,” “tracing over,” and
“drawing pictures with my eyes on the screen.” We conﬁrmed
that the fMRI results using data from just these 16 participants
who described an active maintenance process were similar to
the overall results which included the 25 subjects (see Supple-
mentary Text 3).We also asked participants whether they experi-
enced signiﬁcant mind wandering during maintain conditions.
Three participants answered “yes’” for maintaining scenes, and
4 answered “yes’” for maintaining objects, indicating most parti-
cipants remained focused during the maintain tasks.
Other Ratings
Participants also rated the similarity tomemories of the stimuli—
constructed scenes (rating 1–5, identical to a memory = 5: mean
2.88, SD 0.83), perceived scenes (mean 2.2, SD 1.12), constructed
objects (mean 2.84, SD 1.11), and perceived objects (mean 1.76,
SD 1.13). A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of
task whereby construction was more similar to memories than
perception (F1,24 = 16.22, P = 4.91e − 4). Importantly, however, the
similarity to memories of constructed scenes did not differ sig-
niﬁcantly from the similarity to memories of its object baseline
(t(24) = 0.166, P = 0.87). Likewise, the similarity tomemories of per-
ceived scenes was not signiﬁcantly different from the similarity
to memories of its object baseline (t(24) = 1.844, P = 0.08). The sub-
traction of the object baselines from the scene conditions in the
fMRI analyses therefore goes someway toward controlling for the
similarity to a memory effect.
Finally, we collected ratings to compare the difﬁculty of con-
structing scenes (rating 1–5, very difﬁcult = 5: mean 2.4, SD
0.65), constructing objects (mean 1.32, SD 0.47), maintaining
scenes (mean 2.36, SD 0.99), and maintaining objects (mean
1.68, SD 1.07). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed no differ-
ence in difﬁculty between constructing and maintaining scenes
(F1,24 = 0.939, P = 0.34) but, as expected, scene conditions were sig-
niﬁcantly more difﬁcult than their object baselines (F1,24 = 48.20,
P = 3.53e − 7). We also separately examined the 9 of 25 subjects
who did not report themaintain scenes condition as being active.
We found that their difﬁculty ratings for maintaining scenes
(mean 2.44, SD 0.72) were in fact not signiﬁcantly different from
the difﬁculty ratings they reported for constructing scenes
[mean 2.67, SD 0.5; t-test (t(8) = 1.51, P = 0.17)].
In summary, our post-scan ratings showed good adherence
with the task instructions across subjects, and demonstrated
that the scenes were matched for content (people and move-
ment) across conditions, while scenes and object baselines
were matched for vividness and similarity to memory. Con-
structed objects had greater realism than constructed scenes, al-
though we still considered the rating for scenes to be high (mean
3.88 of 5, SD 0.83). Participantswere also better atmaintaining ob-
jects than maintaining scenes without changing them, although
the difference was marginal and success for scenes was rated as
4.16 of 5 (SD 0.16). Finally, constructing scenes was rated as sig-
niﬁcantlymore difﬁcult than constructing single isolated objects,
andwe suggest that this added difﬁculty was taxing the cognitive
processes of interest.
fMRI data
We begin with a summary of responses across thewhole brain to
constructing, perceiving, andmaintaining scenes before focusing
on our ROI, the hippocampus.
Conﬁrming Engagement of the Scene Network
We conﬁrmed that our stimuli engaged brain regions known to
respond to scene construction, which previous studies had
shown to include hippocampus, PHC, RSC, andmedial prefrontal
cortex (Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire 2007; Spreng et al. 2009;
Summerﬁeld et al. 2010). A contrast was calculated of the scene
conditions relative to the object baselines ([perceive scenes +
construct scenes +maintain perceived scenes +maintain con-
structed scenes]− [perceive objects + construct objects +maintain
perceived objects +maintain constructed objects]), which re-
vealed activation of a priori scene regions in addition to a large
area of visual cortex (Fig. 2, Table 1). We noted that the activation
did not cover the entirety of the hippocampus, but rather was si-
tuated in a circumscribed anterior region, in the medial rather
than lateral portion bilaterally (Fig. 2, top row). Having conﬁrmed
these predicted activations at the whole-brain level, we next
looked within ROIs of the hippocampi to address our speciﬁc ex-
perimental questions.
Hippocampal ROIs
Location of Responses
We began by examining the spatial distribution of voxels
responding to our experimental conditions within the hippo-
campus. We performed group-level SPM analyses with FWE-
corrected statistics for the small volume of bilateral hippocam-
pus. The contrast of perceiving scenes relative to perceiving sin-
gle acontextual objects (perceive scenes – perceive objects)
revealed a swathe of voxels along the length of bilateral hippo-
campi (Fig. 3, top left), with peak coordinates at (−21, −12, −21)
in left and (30, −30, −6) in right hippocampus. Constructing
scenes (construct scenes – construct objects) engaged a cluster
of voxels only in anterior medial hippocampi (Fig. 3, top right),
with peaks at (−21, −18, −21) in left and (24, −15, −21) in right
hippocampi, respectively. To identify voxels involved with
scene maintenance, we performed the contrast of maintain con-
structed scenes –maintain constructed objects. No voxels were
signiﬁcantly activated in this contrast. Although not the main
focus of this investigation, we also examined the maintenance
of perceived scenes. This contrast (maintain perceived scenes –
maintain perceived objects) found only one voxel in left hippo-
campus signiﬁcantly responding to maintaining perceived
scenes (−21, −21, −15). Calculating the intersection (logical con-
junction) of the activation for perceiving and constructing scenes
showed that only voxels in anterior medial hippocampi were en-
gaged by both conditions (Fig. 3, bottom left and right), pointing
to the possibility that this subregionmight be performing a com-
mon cognitive process. Using the hippocampal delineation
scheme of Poppenk et al. (2013), who suggested deﬁning the
rear of the uncus as the border of anterior–posterior hippocam-
pus, these activations were locatedwithin anterior hippocampus
(rear-most voxel y =−21). For completeness, the results of these
contrasts (and those in the next section) across the whole brain
are provided in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2.
Comparison of Conditions
To quantify and compare these hippocampal responses, we cre-
ated masks covering left anterior, right anterior, left posterior,
and right posterior hippocampus (see Materials and Methods).
For each subject, peak parameter estimates were extracted
within each mask for each scene condition and object baselines.
The betas for the object conditions were subtracted from the cor-
responding scene conditions, and the results entered into a
repeated-measures ANOVA with factors of hemisphere (left,
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right), region (anterior, posterior), and condition (perceive, con-
struct, maintain perceived, maintain constructed).
There was no signiﬁcant effect of hemisphere (F1,24 = 0.477,
P = 0.497) nor any interactions involving hemisphere. For this rea-
son, the ROI results (Fig. 4) are shown collapsed over hemisphere.
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of region (anterior/posterior)
(F1,24 = 6.174, P = 0.02), and Figure 4 shows that this was driven by
the stronger response in anterior than posterior hippocampus to
the perceive and construct conditions. There was a signiﬁcant
main effect of condition (F3,72 = 22.105, P = 2.98e − 10) and a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between condition and region (F3,72 = 3.989,
P = 0.018).
To unpack the effect of experimental condition on hippocam-
pal response, we consider our ﬁrst experimental question con-
cerning the relationship between scene perception and scene
construction. Paired t-tests showed the responses were signiﬁ-
cantly greater for scene perception than construction in both an-
terior (t(24) = 2.91, P = 0.008) and posterior hippocampi (t(24) = 3.86,
P = 7.42e − 4). Our second question was whether scene mainten-
ance would be sufﬁcient to explain the hippocampal response
to scene construction. In anterior hippocampus, the response
was signiﬁcantly greater for constructing scenes than main-
taining constructed scenes (t(24) = 5.05, P = 3.69e − 5). Reﬂecting
the SPM result that scene construction was limited to anterior
hippocampus, there was no signiﬁcant difference between con-
structing andmaintaining constructed scenes in posterior hippo-
campus (Fig. 4, bottom; t(24) = 1.00, P = 0.33). Similarly, there was a
signiﬁcantly greater response to perceiving scenes than main-
taining perceived scenes in anterior (t(24) = 4.71, P = 8.17e − 5) as
well as in posterior (t(24) = 4.45, P = 1.68e− 4) hippocampus. There
wasno signiﬁcant difference betweenmaintaining perceived and
maintaining constructed scenes in anterior (t(24) = 0.36, P = 0.72)
or posterior (t(24) = 0.30, P = 0.77) hippocampus.
We conducted 2 supplementary analyses. In the ﬁrst (Supple-
mentary Table 3), we tested whether these responses correlated
with subsequent memory for the stimuli. There were no signiﬁ-
cant correlations in any part of the hippocampus with subse-
quent memory. In the second (Supplementary Text 4 and Figs 1
and 2), we separated out perceiving novel from perceiving re-
peated scenes, conditions which were collapsed in all other ana-
lyses presented here. There was a stronger response in anterior
hippocampus to scenes than objects when the stimuli were
novel. In contrast, posterior hippocampus responded more
strongly to scenes than objects regardless of novelty.
Hippocampal Connectivity
We next performed an exploratory investigation into hippocam-
pal connectivity with wider brain areas using gPPI, a technique
which identiﬁes locations in the brain correlated with a seed re-
gion in the context of one experimental condition over another.
We included the left and right anterior medial hippocampal re-
gions thatwere engaged in common by constructing and perceiv-
ing scenes as seed regions in the PPI analysis. We then compared
the connectivity between the hippocampus and other brain
Figure 2. Main effect of scenes. Top-left: sagittal slice displaying left anterior medial hippocampus and PHC. Top-right: Coronal slice displaying anterior medial
hippocampus. Bottom-left: Sagittal slice displaying left RSC and medial occipital cortex. Bottom-right: Sagittal slice displaying ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
precuneus and medial occipital cortex. Calculated using the contrast of scene conditions relative to their individual object baselines ([perceive scenes + construct
scenes +maintain perceived scenes +maintain constructed scenes] − [perceive objects + construct objects +maintain perceived objects +maintain constructed
objects]). Thresholded at P < 0.05 FWE-corrected and displayed on the averaged structural MRI scan of the 25 subjects. The color bar indicates the t-statistic. See
Table 1 for a full description of the results.
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regions for perceiving scenes, constructing scenes, and con-
structing relative to perceiving scenes (with object baselines sub-
tracted). Maintaining sceneswas not included in this PPI analysis
because without signiﬁcant activation of the hippocampus in
this condition, the choice of voxels to include in the seed region
would have been difﬁcult to motivate.
Perceiving scenes relative to objects (Table 2) lead to greater
connectivity between right hippocampus and bilateral PHC and
right occipito-parietal junction. Left hippocampus was asso-
ciated with the same regions, plus left occipito-parietal junction,
right RSC, and cerebellum. Constructing scenes relative to objects
(Table 2) engaged greater connectivity between right hippocam-
pus and right PHC, left orbito-frontal cortex, right RSC, left fusi-
form gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus, right precuneus, and
primary visual cortex. Left hippocampus connected with right
PHC, left superior temporal sulcus, left occipito-parietal junction,
right RSC, and bilateral superior frontal gyrus.
Next, we directly compared the connectivity associated with
perceiving and constructing scenes (with object baselines sub-
tracted). No brain region had greater connectivity with the hippo-
campus for perceiving more than constructing scenes. However,
the reverse contrast of constructing more than perceiving scenes
revealed increased hippocampal connectivity with a wide set of
brain regions (Fig. 5, Table 3), despite the univariate SPM analysis
not ﬁnding any voxels with a greater activation for scene con-
struction than scene perception.
Most of the PPI results were observed using the right rather
than the left hippocampus as the seed region. In addition, the
right hippocampal activation was associated with activity in re-
gions of both hemispheres, while the left hippocampal activation
was mainly associated with activity in ipsilateral brain areas.
When participants constructed scenes, there was stronger
connectivity between right hippocampus and occipital cortex,
with clusters including primary visual cortex (dorsal to the cal-
carine ﬁssure) and dorsal medial occipital cortex, immediately
posterior to the occipito-parietal junction. Based on their pos-
ition, these likely correspond to areas V1 and V6, respectively
(Pitzalis et al. 2006). In prefrontal cortex, therewere clusters in an-
terior medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the latter also
being found when using left hippocampus as the seed. Parietal
cortex activation was also associated with activity in both hippo-
campi for constructing scenes, including overlapping clusters in
left inferior parietal lobule (IPL). Medially, there was connectivity
between precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and right hippo-
campus. Temporal cortex contained clusters in bilateral superior
temporal sulci, with right hippocampus as the seed.
Together, these ﬁndings demonstrated substantially different
functional connectivity of the hippocampus depending on
whether scenes were constructed or perceived, with stronger
connectivity between anterior medial hippocampus and a dis-
tributed set of brain regions when constructing than perceiving
scenes. Additionally, we tested for differences in connectivity be-
tween posterior hippocampus, which was only engaged by the
perceive scenes condition, and the rest of the brain (Supplemen-
tary Text 5). Each posterior hippocampus had signiﬁcantly stron-
ger connectivity with contralateral PHC when perceiving scenes
relative to objects. Further PPI analyses in posterior collateral sul-
cus, a region on the occipital/temporal cortex border which was
activated in the perceive scenes – perceive objects contrast, re-
vealed stronger connectivity with both primary visual cortex
and PHC when perceiving scenes relative to single objects.
These results suggest that posterior hippocampus and early vis-
ual cortex interact when viewing scenes, via posterior collateral
sulcus and PHC.
Discussion
We set out to characterize the response and connectivity of the
hippocampus when perceiving scenes, constructing scenes in
the imagination and maintaining scenes in working memory.
We ﬁrst asked whether scene perception would engage the
hippocampus, and if so, how this would compare to scene con-
struction. We observed the involvement of the hippocampus in
both perceiving and constructing scenes. Perceiving scenes
gave rise to extensive activation along the length of bilateral
hippocampi, whereas scene construction was restricted to anter-
ior hippocampus, and we identiﬁed a region of anterior medial
hippocampus common to both. Second, we askedwhethermain-
taining scenes would be sufﬁcient to explain the involvement of
the hippocampus in scene construction. Comparing scene condi-
tions revealed that maintaining scenes elicited signiﬁcantly less
activity within the hippocampus than constructing or perceiving
scenes. Third, we explored the connectivity of the hippocampus
during scene construction and scene perception, and found sig-
niﬁcantly stronger connectivity between anterior medial hippo-
campus and a distributed set of brain areas during scene
construction compared with scene perception.
Scene Perception and the Posterior Hippocampus
Whereas scene construction engaged only the anterior medial
portion of the hippocampus, scene perception engaged both pos-
terior and anterior hippocampus. We begin by considering our
ﬁndings in posterior hippocampus. The differences we observed
in this region were unlikely to be due to differences in the nature
of the scenes used in our perceive and construct conditions, as
Table 1 Activation peaks for the contrast of Constructing, Perceiving,
and Maintaining Scenes—Objects baselines
X, Y, Z Z Region
Scenes—Objects
−3, −78, 3 >7.38 L Calcarine sulcus
−21, −45, −9 7.38 L Parahippocampal cortex
−12, −54, 6 7.19 L Retrosplenial cortex
24, −36, −15 7.05 R Parahippocampal cortex
6, −42, 6 7.03 R Retrosplenial cortex
27, −18, −21 5.77 R Anterior medial hippocampus
45, −63, 21 6.28 R Occipital gyrus
−24, −21, −18 6.21 L Anterior medial hippocampus
−3, −63, 54 6.15 L Precuneus
−33, −81, 30 6.10 L Occipital gyrus
18, −42, −48 5.74 R Cerebellum
0, 57, −12 5.38 Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
−54, −12, −18 5.32 L Superior temporal sulcus
6, −54, 66 5.18 R Precuneus
−27, 18, 54 5.16 L Superior frontal sulcus
−3, −42, 48 5.16 L Precuneus
21, 0, 54 5.15 R Superior frontal sulcus
−6, −51, −39 5.10 L Cerebellum
−3, −54, 63 5.02 L Precuneus
−12, −45, −48 5.01 L Cerebellum
3, −51, −39 4.98 R Cerebellum
54, −6, −15 4.87 R Superior temporal sulcus
Note: Thresholded at P < 0.05 FWE-corrected for the volume of the whole brain,
minimum extent 2 voxels. The ﬁrst cluster subsumed 5 regions expected a
priori, and these subpeaks are expanded for clarity.
L, left; R, right.
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extensive pilot testing ensured similarities in content and detail.
Rather, our results suggest posterior hippocampus may have a
particular role in scene perception. Previous studies have demon-
strated engagement of posterior hippocampus in tasks involving
the discrimination of visually similar scenes (Lee, Buckley, et al.
2005; Lee, Bussey, et al. 2005, 2008, 2012; Barense et al. 2010;
Mundy et al. 2012; Aly et al. 2013). Our ﬁnding builds on the
scene discrimination literature in 2 respects. First, these studies
did not distinguish scene construction (creating an internal re-
presentation of the scene to facilitate discrimination) from pro-
cesses which are speciﬁc to visual perception. In this study, we
used a within-subjects design to directly compare visual scene
perception against scene constructionwithout visual perception.
We found that scene construction was not sufﬁcient to engage
posterior hippocampus, but it was engaged when driven by vis-
ual stimuli. Second, in this study, we demonstrated engagement
of the hippocampus during scene viewing without explicit task
demands, which may better reﬂect its function in everyday per-
ception than when tested using discrimination tasks.
Although we treated perception and construction as separate
conditions, we do not suggest that scene perception and con-
struction are independent—as evidenced by the overlap between
perception and construction in anterior hippocampus. We pro-
pose that a common feature of perception and construction is
the need to form an internal model of the scene, and this scene
construction process is mediated by anterior medial hippocam-
pus (we return to anterior hippocampus in the next section).
Given this hypothesis, what function(s) may be performed by
posterior hippocampus which explain why it was engaged by
perceiving scenes relative to perceiving single objects?
One possibility is that posterior hippocampus processes
visuospatial input to support the formation of a scene
Figure 3.ROI analysiswithin amaskof bilateral hippocampus. Top-left: Activation for perceiving scenes, relative to thematched baseline of perceiving objects, shownon a
3D projection of the hippocampus. The viewpoint is at the front of the brain looking down. Top-right: Activation for constructing scenes, relative to thematched baseline
of constructing objects. Bottom-left: Voxels signiﬁcantly engaged by both scene perception and scene construction, shown in 3D projection. Bottom-right: The
intersection shown on sagittal and coronal slices of the group average structural MRI scan, thresholded at P < 0.05 FWE-corrected for the bilateral hippocampal mask.
See the text for a full description of the results.
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representation. This is in keeping with previous studies associat-
ing spatial processingwith dorsal hippocampus in rats (Jung et al.
1994; Moser and Moser 1998) and posterior hippocampus in hu-
mans (Maguire et al. 2000, 2006) and monkeys (Colombo et al.
1998). Indeed, the anatomical connectivity of posterior hippo-
campus gives good reason to expect a particular role in visual
scene perception. It has strong connectivity with the ventral vis-
ual streams via PHC (Kahn et al. 2008; Libby et al. 2012), and a sup-
plementary PPI analysis of our data (Supplementary Text 5)
suggested that visuospatial sensory information may have
reached posterior hippocampus via PHC. Constructed scenes, in
contrast, were endogenously generated and so did not contain
primary sensory input. Further evidence that posterior hippo-
campus supports scene construction when viewing scenes
comes from recent work on scene discrimination. Aly and Yone-
linas (2012) distinguished 2 processes used by participants to per-
form scene discrimination—making judgments based on the
scene’s global conﬁguration, or strength-based perception, and
based on local visual features, or state-based perception.
Strength-based perception depends on constructing a model or
representation of the global features of the scene—and the
authors identiﬁed left posterior hippocampus associated with
this process (Aly et al. 2013).
The role of posterior hippocampusmay go beyond processing
the visuospatial information currently available and extend to
making predictions of the scene beyond the view. Posterior
hippocampus has been implicated in BE, the automatic process
of extrapolating beyond the view (Intraub and Richardson 1989).
Patients with hippocampal lesions showed attenuated BE
(Mullally, Intraub, and Maguire 2012) and Chadwick et al. (2013)
found that speciﬁcally posterior hippocampus was engaged
when healthy controls viewed simple scenes and experienced
BE. Thus, posterior hippocampus may contribute predictions of
what lies beyond the edges of the current view, to support the cre-
ation and updating of a scene model in anterior medial hippo-
campus. In a supplementary analysis using a subset of our
data, we compared the perception of novel scenes with the per-
ception of scenes which had already been viewed for 8 s (Supple-
mentary Figs 1 and 2 and Text 4). We found that posterior
hippocampus was engaged when perceiving repeated scenes as
well as scenes thatwere novel. In contrast, anterior hippocampus
was only engaged when scenes were novel, relative to object
baselines. This ﬁnding is consistent with a role for posterior
hippocampus constantly predicting beyond the boundaries of
the scene, regardless of scene novelty. A related possibility is
that visuospatial predictions from posterior hippocampus not
only support the creation of an internal model of the scene, but
also guide ongoing scene perception. Bayesian and predictive
coding theories of perception suggest that higher brain areas
send predictions down the sensory processing hierarchy (Jaynes
1988; Friston and Kiebel 2009), and the beneﬁt of having a scene
model to guide perception has long been recognized. By playing a
role in setting up expectations, also called contexts, schemas
(Biederman 1981), gist or frames (Friedman 1979), it is suggested
that scenes facilitate the subsequent identiﬁcation of objects (re-
viewed by Henderson and Hollingworth 1999). Further experi-
ments will be needed to test whether prior knowledge of a
scene modulates posterior hippocampus activity.
Figure 4. Summary and comparison of ROI results. Top: Anterior hippocampus (from the most anterior slice to y =−21 inclusive). Bottom: Posterior hippocampus. Bars
represent the peak parameter estimate for the relevant scene condition minus the peak parameter estimate for the relevant object baseline. Results are collapsed over
hemisphere. Error bars indicate standard error across subjects and asterisks indicate signiﬁcant differences based on paired sample t-tests at P < 0.05; see text for full
results.
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An alternative explanation for our ﬁndings is that posterior
hippocampus simply functions to encode a memory of the
scene. When stimuli are being processed which exceed the
limit of working memory, the hippocampus may be engaged to
encode stimuli in LTM (Jeneson and Squire 2012). Furthermore,
as our participants did not know if they would subsequently
have to maintain the scenes they perceived, they may have
beenmaking a particular effort to remember their details. Several
lines of evidence suggest that LTM encoding is not sufﬁcient to
explain our results in posterior hippocampus. First, each scene
was compared against a matched baseline of perceiving single
objects. A surprise memory test after scanning showed that ob-
jects were remembered equally well as the scenes, and so these
baselines should have accounted for basic encoding processes.
However, it could be argued that the hippocampal preference
for scenes or complex stimuli means that it would be involved
in encoding scenes but not objects into LTM and, thus, the object
baselines would not control for this. Oneway to de-correlate hip-
pocampal scene perception from memory encoding would be to
look at subsequentmemory effects. A previous studywith a simi-
lar time interval as ours speciﬁcally investigated the relationship
between scene perception in the hippocampus and subsequent
memory. Lee et al. (2013) found hippocampal activation for
scene oddity judgments, regardless of whether participants sub-
sequently remembered or forgot the scenes 10 min later. Indeed,
in an additional analysis of our data, we found no correlation be-
tween hippocampal activation and subsequent memory per-
formance. Furthermore, if memory encoding were responsible
for activation of posterior hippocampus, one might expect that
perceiving a repeated or familiar scene would not engage
posterior hippocampus, as there would be nothing new to en-
code. As already mentioned, we compared perception of novel
with familiar scenes. While there was a signiﬁcant novelty re-
sponse in posterior hippocampus, both novel and repeated
scenes gave robust activation, arguing against encoding being
sufﬁcient explanation for our posterior hippocampus activation.
While our main interest in including scene maintenance was
to compare it against scene construction, our results also speak
to a related question—whether hippocampal engagement in
scene perception may be explained by maintenance. This is of
particular importance for considering the results of scene dis-
crimination studies, where multiple scenes must be held online
while they are compared. Lee and Rudebeck (2010) found that
working memory load increased right posterior hippocampal re-
sponse to scenes, but not baseline shape stimuli. Other studies
have also suggested hippocampal engagement in scene memory
over short retention periods (Hannula et al. 2006; Schmidt et al.
2007; Jeneson et al. 2011). In this study, we tested perceiving
scenes, maintaining perceived scenes in working memory and
compared the 2 and found only a single signiﬁcant voxel in left
hippocampus for scene maintenance, whereas there was exten-
sive activity throughout bilateral hippocampi for scene percep-
tion, and the activity for perception was signiﬁcantly stronger
than for maintenance. Thus, the need to maintain the contents
of the scenewhile it is perceived does not seem to explain hippo-
campal activation for perception. It is pertinent to consider how
this maintenance result relates to previous studies. First, we fo-
cused speciﬁcally on the working memory maintenance period,
unlike the other studies referenced above, and we also did not
manipulate memory load. A further difference concerns the
task demands. The study by Lee and Rudebeck (2010), for in-
stance, required participants to compare the spatial location of
elements of the currently viewed scene against scenes they had
previously viewed (a 1- or 2-back test). Unlike their study, our par-
ticipants only had tomaintain one scene at a time and so did not
need to switch between perceived and remembered scenes dur-
ing a trial. This switching effect could tax the same construction
process of interest here. More generally, adding more scenes or
adding more detail within scenes to increase working memory
loadmay also place greater demand on the processes which con-
struct the hippocampal representation of the scenes. Thus, care
should be taken when attempting to separate working memory
load from the scene construction process.
In reviewing anterior–posterior differences in the hippocam-
pus, Poppenk et al. (2013) suggested that posterior hippocampus
responds to ﬁne detail or ﬁne-grained representations, whereas
anterior hippocampus processes more coarse or abstract repre-
sentations. One aspect of “detail” may be the number of objects
which make up the scene, and perhaps the perceived scenes in
our study hadmore objects than the constructed scenes, leading
to additional posterior hippocampal engagement. Although we
did not take per-trial ratings of the level of detail, our imagined
scenes were rated high on realism and we established that as-
pects of the content did not differ signiﬁcantly between con-
structed and perceived scenes. In addition, both scene types
were recalled with similar accuracy in a post-scan memory test.
Furthermore, the study of Chadwick et al. (2013), which asso-
ciated BEwith engagement of posterior hippocampus, used stim-
uli consisting of very simple scenes (a single object on a
naturalistic background) displayed for 250 ms, suggesting even
scenes containing a single object are sufﬁcient to engage poster-
ior hippocampus. A second aspect of detail may concern ﬁne-
grained visual or spatial detail, which could vary independently
of the number of objects. Participants’ ratings for vividness were
Table 2 Hippocampal network for construct scenes > objects and
perceive scenes > objects (PPI)
X, Y, Z Z Region Hippocampus
seed
Construct Scenes > Objects (PPI)
30, −39, −9 5.50 R PHC Left
−48, −12, −15 3.93 L STS Left
−18, −57, 12 4.36 L OPJ Left
15, −48, 9 3.66 R OPJ Left
3, 12, 51 3.60 R Superior frontal gyrus Left
−6, 15, 51 3.52 L Superior frontal gyrus Left
30, −36, −12 4.81 R PHC Right
−39, 33, −18 4.27 L OFC Right
6, −42, 3 4.04 R RSC Right
−12, −54, 15 3.61 L OPJ Right
−30, −36, 24 3.60 L Fusiform gyrus Right
−6, 15, 51 3.53 L Superior frontal gyrus Right
6, −66, 48 3.43 R Precuneus Right
15, −84, 0 3.37 R Calcarine sulcus Right
Perceive scenes > objects (PPI)
30, −36, −15 4.24 R PHC Left
18, −57, 21 4.04 R RSC Left
−27, −42, −15 3.96 L PHC Left
0, −54, −33 3.85 Cerebellum Left
−15, −39, −45 3.78 Cerebellum Left
−18, −54, 6 3.40 L OPJ Left
−27, −42, −15 4.31 L PHC Right
21, −30, −21 4.24 R PHC Right
21, −57, 18 3.51 R OPJ Right
Note: Thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected, minimum extent 5 voxels.
OPJ, occipito-parietal junction; STS, superior temporal sulcus; L, left; R, right.
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matched for perceived and constructed scenes, although again
this was not a per-trial measure and imagined objects within
the constructed scenes may have had less detail than objects in
the scene photographs. Thus, ﬁne-grained visual information
could have contributed to the response we observed in posterior
hippocampus for the perceive scenes condition. However, we
note that our “perceive object” baseline condition, which con-
sisted of color photographs of objects, should have controlled
for detail to some extent. Furthermore, studies varying the spa-
tial frequency of visually presented stimuli, and thereby control-
ling the level of ﬁne detail, did not identify a difference in
hippocampal response (Rajimehr et al. 2011; Zeidman et al. 2012).
In summary, we found posterior hippocampus to be involved
in scene perception. We suggest that it contributes to the con-
struction of a coherent model of the scene by processing
visuospatial input and that memory encoding or detail are not
sufﬁcient to explain its role. The anterior–posterior hippocampal
distinction we have documented here adds to a growing body of
evidence of functional differentiation within the hippocampus
that clearly requires further elucidation (Poppenk et al. 2013).
Scene Perception and Scene Construction Engage the
Anterior Medial Hippocampus
We found that visually perceiving scenes and constructing
scenes in the imagination engaged a common brain region, lo-
cated in the medial aspect of anterior hippocampus. What func-
tion might this region serve? Of note, other fMRI studies
involving scene stimuli have also implicated anterior medial
hippocampus, with tasks such as imagining and recalling scenes
Figure 5. Exploratory PPI analysis of constructing more than perceiving scenes, with object baseline conditions subtracted from each. Projections (shown in the axial,
coronal, and sagittal planes) of the left anterior medial hippocampal region are shown in gold and the right anterior medial hippocampal region in purple. Small
circles outside the hippocampi indicate peaks of activation which had signiﬁcantly stronger connectivity with the corresponding hippocampus for constructing than
perceiving scenes. The branching pattern is for visual clarity only. Numbers refer to regions detailed in Table 3. The left side of the brain is on the left. There were no
signiﬁcant PPI results for the reverse contrast of Perceive > Construct Scenes. Both contrasts were conducted at P < 0.001 uncorrected with a minimum extent of 5 voxels.
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(Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire 2007), spatial and autobio-
graphical memory recall (Hoscheidt et al. 2010), and scene dis-
crimination (Lee et al. 2013).
One possibility is that anterior hippocampus forms arbitrary
associations between stimuli (Schacter and Wagner 1999). While
the process of scene construction involves forming associations
between elements of the scene representation across cortex (Ma-
guire andMullally 2013), and as evidenced by our connectivity re-
sultswhichwe return to shortly,we suggest that it is unlikely that
the primary function of anterior hippocampus is to encode arbi-
trary associations. Patients with bilateral hippocampal damage
can state the objects they would expect to see beyond the current
view, suggesting preserved processing of associations, but they
cannot describe the spatial relationships between objects they
cannot see (Mullally, Intraub, and Maguire 2012). Thus, the spa-
tial element of the association seems crucial to hippocampal
function. It has also been suggested that anterior hippocampus
ﬂexibly re-combines episodic memories to form novel scenes
(Addis et al. 2009; Martin et al. 2011; Schacter et al. 2012). We
have demonstrated that the function of anterior hippocampus
goes beyond this—it is engaged by perceiving scenes never ex-
perienced before by the participants, as well as by constructing
scenes with the instruction to make them as unlike previous ex-
periences as possible.
We propose that the hippocampus draws together semantic
information, objects, and spatial information into a single scene
representation, in agreement with frameworks such as the scene
construction theory (Hassabis and Maguire 2007, 2009; Maguire
and Mullally 2013) and the emergent memory account (Graham
et al. 2010). Visual perception and imagination are both able to
engage anterior medial hippocampus to form a representation
ormodel of the scene. This may be supported by posterior hippo-
campus, but this is not required when the scene is (re)con-
structed endogenously based on memory or imagination
(Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire 2007).
If anteriormedial hippocampus operates to form a representa-
tion of a scene, then it should bemaximally engagedby perceiving
or imagining novel scenes rather than recapitulating recently con-
structed scenes. A number of studies have shown that anterior
hippocampus responds more strongly to novel than repeated
scenes. For instance, Poppenk et al. (2010) found anterior hippo-
campus to respond more strongly to novel relative to familiar
subsequently remembered scenes. Scene novelty was also inves-
tigated by Howard et al. (2011), who manipulated the relative
placement of objects, backgrounds and whole scenes presented
visually. They found left anterior hippocampus was maximally
activated when changing the position of an object with respect
to its background, thereby altering the spatial conﬁguration of
the scene. Thus, anteriorhippocampusmaybe sensitive to the ap-
pearance of an entirely novel scene or to a novel conﬁguration of
an existing scene. As mentioned above, we investigated novelty
effects in a supplementary analysis speciﬁcally for the perceive
scenes condition, and found anterior hippocampus to be engaged
more by perceiving novel than repeated stimuli. Furthermore,
when our participants constructed novel scenes anterior hippo-
campus was engaged, but not when they maintained previously
constructed scenes in workingmemory. Novelty per se is not suf-
ﬁcient to explain our fMRI results, as our scene contrasts were
each relative to matched baselines which used novel objects.
However, a novelty effect particularly relating to scenes rather
than objects would accord with our results—but is such an ex-
planation sufﬁcient, andwhat function could scenenovelty serve?
One possibility is that anterior hippocampus responds to
scene novelty because it is involved in incidental encoding in
LTM. Indeed, anterior hippocampus was speciﬁcally implicated
by Schacter and Wagner (1999) who proposed that it encodes
novel associations or relations between stimuli, regardless of
what the stimuli contain. Following this, several studies have im-
plicated anterior hippocampus in encoding word–pair, picture–
pair, or name–face associations (Pihlajamaki et al. 2003; Sperling
et al. 2003; Prince et al. 2005; Chua et al. 2007). In a recent study,
Gaesser et al. (2013) investigated hippocampal involvement in as-
sembling the elements of imagined future events, while control-
ling for novelty and encoding using a modiﬁed recombination
paradigm (Addis et al. 2009). When controlling for novelty and
encoding, a contrast of imagining newevents > re-imagining pre-
viously imagined events revealed left posterior hippocampus.
Without these controls, the authors additionally found right pos-
terior and anterior hippocampus. They concluded that construc-
tion of the event occurs in posterior hippocampus—whereas
anterior hippocampus reﬂects only an encoding or novelty con-
found. The difﬁculty in interpreting that result stems from the
re-imagine condition, which introduces an additional process
of event/scene recall. If anterior hippocampus were involved in
constructing novel imagined scenes in addition to constructing
scenes recalled fromLTM, then a difference in activation between
these conditions would not be expected in anterior hippocam-
pus. Evidence for this comes from Hassabis, Kumaran, and
Maguire (2007), who performed the similar contrast of construct-
ing novel scenarios > recalling previously constructed events (al-
beit without control for novelty and from a week earlier rather
Table 3 Hippocampal network for construct > perceive scenes (PPI)a
X, Y, Z Z Region Hippocampus
seed
1 −42, 51, 0 4.54 L DLPFC Left
2 −54, −66, 30 4.18 L Posterior parietal cortex Left
3 21, 9, 63 4.15 R Superior frontal gyrus Left
4 −51, −45, 54 3.94 L Supramarginal gyrus Left
5 −42, 21, 3 3.88 L Supramarginal gyrus Left
6 −36, 27, 30 3.82 L Middle frontal gyrus Left
7 −39, 42, 12 3.78 L Inferior frontal sulcus Left
8 −42, −51, 42 3.76 L Supramarginal gyrus Left
9 −42, 18, 45 3.41 L Middle frontal gyrus Left
10 −63, −33, −3 3.4 L Superior temporal sulcus Left
11 3, 54, 9 4.22 R Medial PFC Right
12 −3, −54, 33 4.16 L Precuneus Right
13 −6, −87, 30 4.04 L Dorsal occipital gyrus Right
14 −30, 60, 3 4.02 L Superior frontal gyrus Right
15 −51, −63, 36 3.99 L Angular Gyrus Right
16 12, −93, 9 3.98 R Calcarine sulcus Right
17 −24, 27, 51 3.98 L Superior frontal sulcus Right
18 −51, −45, 54 3.9 L Inferior parietal lobule Right
19 −36, 27, 30 3.86 L Middle frontal gyrus Right
20 −48, −54, 51 3.85 L Inferior parietal lobule Right
21 54, −36, 3 3.79 R Superior temporal sulcus Right
22 45, 15, 51 3.75 R Middle frontal Gyrus Right
23 −54, −33, −3 3.73 L Superior temporal sulcus Right
24 51, −60, 33 3.68 R Angular gyrus Right
25 6, −48, 18 3.63 R Posterior cingulate cortex Right
26 0, 30, 42 3.57 Anterior cingulate cortex Right
27 48, −54, 51 3.53 R Inferior parietal lobule Right
28 51, −66, 39 3.5 R Inferior parietal lobule Right
29 21, 42, 36 3.46 R Superior frontal sulcus Right
Note: Thresholded at P < 0.001 uncorrected, minimum extent 5 voxels.
DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; L, left, R, right.
aSee also Figure 5.
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than a day earlier). They found scene construction and recall sep-
arately engaged anterior or mid hippocampus (c.f. Tables 4 and 5
in Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire 2007), with no difference in
hippocampal activation between conditions.
We suggest that LTM encoding of arbitrary associations, rela-
tions or events is not a goodmodel for explaining anterior hippo-
campal activation in scene perception and scene construction.
First, as mentioned above, in an additional analysis of our data,
we found no correlation between hippocampal activation and
subsequent memory. The scene discrimination literature has
also demonstrated successful performance independent of sub-
sequentmemory—Lee et al. (2013) found amain effect in bilateral
anterior hippocampus for correct versus incorrect scene oddity
judgments, regardless of whether the scenes were subsequently
remembered or forgotten. Martin et al. (2011) had participants
construct episodes (as opposed to static scenes used in this
study) and report the level of detail in each, followed by a surprise
memory test. They did ﬁnd subsequent memory effects in anter-
ior and posterior hippocampus, but they additionally found each
of these regions to be modulated by the level of detail in the ima-
gined scenes. From this result, they suggested that “the contribu-
tion of these hippocampal regions to encoding success might
depend, at least in part, on the ability to construct a detailed
and therefore memorable simulation” (p. 13861). In agreement
with this, we suggest that while encoding a memory of a scene
likely depends on anterior hippocampus, in order to have a
scene to remember in the ﬁrst place, this region must have suc-
cessfully constructed it. Perceiving or imagining novel scenes
places greater demand on anterior hippocampus than perceiving
or re-imagining recently constructed scenes, because of the need
to form a novel representation.
In summary,wepropose that the activation of anteriormedial
hippocampus by constructing and perceiving scenes is best ex-
plained not by LTM encoding, novelty or recall, but by the process
of scene construction. This is the creation of a spatially coherent
representation of the scene, whether perceived or imagined. Ac-
tivity in posterior hippocampus supports this process, speciﬁcal-
ly when the scene is presented visually.
Scene Maintenance Does Not Explain Hippocampal
Involvement in Scene Construction
The second question we set out to address was what aspect of
scene processing is undertaken by the hippocampus—is it the
construction of the scene representation, as scene construction
theory proposes (Maguire andMullally 2013), or would justmain-
taining a representation of a scene in working memory be sufﬁ-
cient to engage the hippocampus? We found no signiﬁcant
activation in the hippocampus for maintaining constructed
scenes in working memory above and beyond that for maintain-
ing objects, and peak activity was signiﬁcantly less for maintain-
ing constructed scenes than for constructing scenes.
One explanation for reduced hippocampal activation for
maintaining scenes is that it may not have been an engaging
task. However, we found that maintaining scenes was not a pas-
sive process. Two thirds of subjects reported active strategies
while maintaining scenes, and even those who reported more
passivity did not rate scenemaintenance as any easier than con-
structing scenes. The fMRI results were not any different when
only those 16 subjects who reported active maintenance pro-
cesses were considered. We infer from these results that scene
maintenance is not sufﬁcient to explain the activity we see for
scene construction. Furthermore, this also argues against the
possibility that working memory load could explain the
activation we observed for scene construction—both construc-
tion andmaintenance required processing of the same scene on-
line, yet activation was signiﬁcantly greater for construction.
It is important to note that this study was not designed to ex-
perimentallymanipulateworkingmemory load and, thus, our re-
sults make no claims as to the involvement of the hippocampus
inworkingmemory per se. There is evidence fromprevious stud-
ies ofworkingmemory using scene stimuli that loadmayhavean
effect on the hippocampus, and there is indirect evidence that it
may interact with scene construction. Stern et al. (2001) found
hippocampal activation increased with working memory load
speciﬁcally for novel scenes, but not repeated scenes, suggesting
that it has an effect during the creation of the scene representa-
tion. Lee and Rudebeck (2010) investigated the interaction be-
tween working memory load and stimulus type (scenes or
shapes) in posterior hippocampus and PHC, using 1-back and
2-back memory tasks. They found working memory load only
had an effect for scenes and not shapes, suggesting that working
memory load might have an effect in the hippocampus but only
when scene representations are constructed. In a neuropsycho-
logical study, Hartley et al. (2007) investigated scene perception
(a match to sample task) and working memory (a delayed
match to sample task) in 4 patients with focal hippocampal le-
sions. Two patients had deﬁcits in perception, but all 4 had deﬁ-
cits in working memory, for as little as 2-s delay. The authors
inferred that scene perception may be supported by regions out-
side the hippocampus, whereas scene memory, even over short
periods, always requires the hippocampus. In contrast, setting
out to demonstrate that the hippocampuswould only be engaged
when working memory limits were exceeded, Jeneson et al.
(2011) found that patients with hippocampal lesions were im-
paired at matching scenes in a demanding continuous recogni-
tion task but, in a standard study-test task, they were only
impaired at longer delays. It is also important to consider in inter-
preting studies such as this, where the sample and test scenes
differ in the arrangement of their contents, that patients’ lack
of a hippocampal scene model could impair performance inde-
pendently of working memory demands.
In summary, while working memory load may modulate the
level of hippocampal activity for maintained scenes, we found
neither the maintenance of rich, naturalistic visually presented
scenes nor themaintenance of endogenously constructed scenes
to be sufﬁcient to explain activity for scene perception and scene
construction.
Functional Connectivity of the Hippocampus During
Scene Construction
Our third question concerned the functional connectivity of the
hippocampus during scene construction. Having identiﬁed a re-
gion of hippocampus common to scene construction and scene
perception, this also gave us the opportunity to explore whether
this region communicateswith different brain regions depending
on the task, despite being engaged by both.We found signiﬁcant-
ly stronger connectivity with a widely distributed set of brain
areas during scene construction compared with scene percep-
tion. The majority of the connectivity ﬁndings arose when
using the right hippocampus as the seed region, with fewer re-
sults involving increased connectivity with the left hippocam-
pus. Several previous studies involving scene construction have
noted the preferential engagement of the right hippocampus
(Weiler et al. 2010; Martin et al. 2011; Mullally, Hassabis, and Ma-
guire 2012). We now extend this by showing that connectivity
particularly with right anterior medial hippocampus was
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enhanced during scene construction. The right hippocampal in-
volvement may be related to the visuospatial nature of the stim-
uli; such a preference for the right hippocampus has long been
recognized (Milner 1975).
We hypothesized enhanced connectivity between the hippo-
campus and cortex during scene construction, reﬂecting the
need for the hippocampus to access cortically stored scene ele-
ments to facilitate construction. In this regard, it is interesting
to note the locations with which the anterior medial hippocam-
pus showed enhanced connectivity. Left hippocampus had en-
hanced connectivity with left superior temporal sulcus and
right hippocampus had enhanced connectivity with bilateral su-
perior temporal sulci. Results from studies on patients with se-
mantic dementia or with lesions to the anterior temporal lobe
have implicated this part of the brain in semantic processing
(Binder et al. 2009), especially in extracting meaning from
words (Price 2010), with the strongest effects found when sub-
jects are probed with more difﬁcult semantic association tasks
(Lambon Ralph et al. 2012). Similarly, studies using transcranial
magnetic stimulation with healthy participants have shown
that temporary inhibition of anterior temporal lobe alone causes
impairments in picture naming, object naming, and synonym
ﬁnding (Pobric et al. 2007, 2010), tasks intended to test semantic
processing. One study which had better anatomical speciﬁcity
than most (Binney et al. 2010) narrowed down this “semantic
hub” speciﬁcally to anterior superior temporal sulcus as well as
anterior fusiform gyrus and anterior inferior temporal gyrus, re-
gions of high-level association cortex whichmay provide seman-
tic association processing, permitting selection of the most
relevant elements for inclusion into a scene.
We also hypothesized enhanced coupling between hippo-
campus and dorsal or ventral visual regions, associated with
vivid imagining of the scenes. Both left and right anterior hippo-
campal ROIs had stronger connectivity with left IPL during scene
construction relative to perception. Right hippocampus addition-
ally connected with right IPL. Kravitz et al. (2011) sought to up-
date the notion of dorsal and ventral streams for visual
processing by reviewing tract-tracing studies in monkeys. Their
model identiﬁed a “parieto-medial temporal” pathway whereby
visual information passes between IPL and hippocampus, both
directly and indirectly via RSC and PHC. They suggest a role for
this pathway in directing spatial attention or translating egocen-
tric and allocentric reference frames. Earlier in the visual hier-
archy, we found PPI results in primary visual cortex for
constructing more than perceiving scenes using right anterior
hippocampus as the seed region. Greater connectivity between
right hippocampus and early occipital areas could reﬂect the
hippocampus accessing reactivated sensory representations, in
keeping with previous studies showing that vivid mental im-
agery engages occipital cortex (Ganis et al. 2004; Chadwick et al.
2013) and that activity in early visual areas correlates with the
vividness ofmental imagery (Cui et al. 2007). Indeed, a key feature
of scene construction is vividly experiencing a spatially coherent
scene in the mind’s eye, and it is this experience which is lost by
patients with hippocampal lesions (Mullally, Intraub, and Ma-
guire 2012). Our results suggest that a disconnection between
hippocampus and early visual areas, a pathway thought to be
mediated by PHC and RSC (Byrne et al. 2007), could play a role
in the patients’ scene construction deﬁcit.
In a supplementary analysis (Supplementary Text 5) we
tested for connectivity between posterior hippocampus, which
was only engaged by the perceive scenes condition relative to ob-
ject baselines, and the rest of cortex. We did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
connectivity with early visual cortex as wewould have predicted,
but rather speciﬁc coupling with PHCwhen subjects visually per-
ceived scenes. Further PPI analyses involving posterior collateral
sulcus, a region of the ventral visual stream on the occipital/tem-
poral cortex border, showed coupling with both PHC and early
visual cortex. A dissociation may be made between our ﬁndings
in anterior and posterior hippocampus. Anterior hippocampus
had stronger connectivity with early visual cortex during scene
construction than perception, potentially because anterior
hippocampus drives production of sensory imagery. Posterior
hippocampus was only engaged during scene perception, and it
communicated with PHC, through which it may have received
visual information via the ventral visual stream.
Finally,wealso foundgreater PPI connectivity betweenbilateral
anterior hippocampi and multiple loci in dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex for scene construction more than perception. This region
is anatomically connected to the hippocampus via presubiculum,
PHC, and RSC (Aggleton 2012), and is reliably engaged as part of the
“core network” for episodic memory and scene construction
(Spreng et al. 2009; Summerﬁeld et al. 2010). It has been implicated
in attention andmonitoring (Markett et al. 2014), raising the possi-
bility that these frontal regions may be involved in executive con-
trol within the scene construction network.
It has previously been suggested that the hippocampus acts
a hub of connectivity in memory formation and consolidation
(Battaglia et al. 2011) and was identiﬁed as one of a “rich club”
of 12 highly connected brains hubs (van den Heuvel and Sporns
2011). Our PPI results indicatewhich regions itmay communicate
with during scene construction. Based on our PPI analyses, we
hypothesize that successful communication between anterior
medial hippocampus and areas within parietal, frontal and tem-
poral cortices underpins scene construction, which may explain
why hippocampal lesions are so detrimental to scene construc-
tion, and to other functions such as episodicmemory and spatial
navigation that also rely on hippocampal interaction with mul-
tiple brain regions.
Scene Construction and Scene Perception: a Synthesis
Scene construction, scene perception, and working memory
maintenance for scenes were addressed as 3 separate conditions
in this study; however as alreadymentioned, they are unlikely to
be independent. Scene construction and scene perception share
common activation in anterior medial hippocampus, and it is
likely that both depend on processes of working memory main-
tenance. As mentioned in the Introduction, there is evidence
on both sides of the debate as to whether the hippocampus is in-
volved in perception. We suggest that a model based on scene
construction can help elucidate these disparate results.
When constructing a scene, a representation is created in the
hippocampus. Several processes may feed into this. LTM recall
contributes elements to be added into a constructed scene, as
does information from visual perception, if available. Encoding
and maintaining the representation in working memory enables
the scene to be constructed over an extended period of time,
without loss of detail while the scene is being constructed. If
and only if scene construction has occurred, dependent pro-
cesses are facilitated. For instance, discrimination tasks where
scenes are shown from different viewpoints can only be com-
pleted successfully if a coherent spatial model has been con-
structed. Similarly, LTM encoding depends on the scene
representation having been constructed, in order for it to be con-
solidated into LTM. BE only occurs if a scene model has ﬁrst been
encoded. We propose this model is instantiated in a distributed
scene network, including anterior medial hippocampus which
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mediates the distributed scene representation and posterior
hippocampus and PHC which integrate the visually perceived
scene into the representation. Of course, the interaction between
scene construction and dependent processes is likely to be more
complex than described. The hippocampal scene model, for in-
stance, could reciprocally provide top-down expectations or
priors onto early visual cortex (Chadwick et al. 2013). Similarly,
pattern completion in the hippocampus would drive additional
retrieval from LTM (Marr 1971).
Under this account, differences in thewider scene perception
literature may be explained by whether participants needed to
construct spatially coherent scenes. This is in agreement with
other authors who have suggested that the hippocampus is in-
volved in scene perception when an allocentric, viewpoint-inde-
pendent representation is employed for the task (Hartley et al.
2007; Lee et al. 2012; Aly et al. 2013). Scene construction in the per-
ceptual domain may accord with strength-based perception of
Aly et al. (2013), but it goes further by placing scenes at the center
of hippocampal function and proposing a common process
across perception, imagination and episodic memory (Maguire
and Mullally 2013). In this study, we have provided evidence
that this common construction process is supported by anterior
medial hippocampus. Importantly, while scene perception can
engage the hippocampus, the hippocampus is not required for
perceiving scenes. Patients with hippocampal lesions tested by
Mullally, Intraub, and Maguire (2012) and Race et al. (2013)
could richly describe scenes that were put in front of them,
which in the latter study included forming detailed narrative de-
scriptions of scene images. If so much can be achieved without
the hippocampal scene representation, what purpose might it
serve? Mullally, Intraub, and Maguire (2012) found that when
these same patients were asked to imagine stepping back from
the photographs, they could list the objects they might see, but
they could not describe the spatial relationships which would
exist between them. In a similar vein, when we perceive scenes,
we are subject to the scene-speciﬁc cognitive phenomenon of BE.
The BE effect depends on scene construction, as the world be-
yond the scene borders must be internally generated. Thus, it
may be that healthy individuals are never passively perceiving
scenes because the BE effect, underpinned byscene construction,
always occurs and engages the hippocampus. Thus, without a
hippocampal model being constructed, the scene currently in
view can only be comprehended in isolation and cannot be ex-
tended beyond its borders or in one’s imagination.
Summary and Conclusions
In this study, we found that a common region of anterior medial
hippocampus is engaged by viewing scenes and constructing
scenes in the imagination.We showed that this activation cannot
be explained by maintenance of the scene representation alone,
providing additional evidence that hippocampus is involved in
the construction of the scene representation. We also explored
the functional connectivity of this region for perception and con-
struction of scenes, and demonstrated awide network of connec-
tions for scene construction. Our results support the notion that
scenes are important for understanding the role of the hippo-
campus, and that scene construction may extend beyond mem-
ory and imagination into online scene perception.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material can be found at http://www.cercor.
oxfordjournals.org/.
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